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Abstract
Major League Baseball (MLB) franchises expend an abundance of resources on scouting in preparation for the June Amateur Draft. In addition to the classic “tools” assessed, another factor considered is age: younger players may get selected over older
players of equal ability because of anticipated development, whereas college players
may get selected over high school players due to a shortened latency before reaching
the majors. Additionally, Little League rules in effect until 2006 operated on an August 1-July 31 year, meaning that, in their youth, players born on August 1 were the
eldest relative to their cohort. We examine the performance of players selected in the
June Draft from 1987-2011. We find that for all draftees, more relatively old players
are selected in the Draft. Conversely, for high school (HS) draftees, both relative age
and absolute age have a significant negative relationship with the odds of reaching
the major leagues. Given that a HS draftee reaches the majors, there is no difference
in professional performance based on age or relative age, measured by games played,
wins above replacement (WAR) and on-base plus slugging percentage (OPS). For
college draftees the results are less clear. We find that age, but not relative age, has a
significant negative relationship with the odds of reaching MLB. Given that a college
draftee reaches the majors, there is no difference in professional performance based
on age or relative age. Had the draft market operated efficiently, neither relative
age nor age on draft day would have captured additional variation in performance
after controlling for draft position and other factors. We conclude that teams have
undervalued both absolutely, and relatively, younger high school players in the draft
and have undervalued absolutely young and relatively old college draftees.
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Introduction

Do Major League Baseball (MLB) teams always make the “best” selections in the
June Amateur Draft based on players future performance? Well, the simple answer is
no. Take Mike Piazza for example who was selected in the 62nd round, 1, 390th overall,
by the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1988 who accumulated a career 59.2 WAR (average
WAR for all draftees 1987-2011 was .45) over 1,912 career games played at the major
league level and is likely headed to the Hall of Fame in the coming years. At the
same time, the Dodgers 1st round pick, 5th overall, that year was Bill Bene who spent
9 seasons bouncing around the minor leagues before washing out prior to reaching
the majors and eventually getting a 6 month jail sentence for operating a counterfeit
karaoke business and failing to pay taxes on the income he earned. That is a pretty
stark difference in career outcomes. A more recent example is Wade Townsend who
was selected 8th overall by the Tampa Bay Devil Rays (now the Rays) in 2005 only to
play in 4 affiliated minor league seasons before being released after an injury riddled
career; while pitchers such as Tommy Hanson and Jaime Garcia have enjoyed major
league success after being selected in the 22nd round of the same year.
What do these successful players have in common? Perhaps not much at all, but
these examples illustrate that teams do not have perfect information in the market
about who will succeed and who will fail. This occurs even though MLB franchises
expend an abundance of resources on scouting each year in preparation for the June
Amateur Draft. Thus, we attempt to find places where we can inform teams on how
to better select their players. We attempt to find any inefficiencies in the Draft market
based on age effects.
In addition to the classic “tools” (e.g. ability to hit for average, hit for power,
throw, field, and run) assessed, another factor considered by teams is age: younger
players may get selected over older players of equal ability because of anticipated
development; whereas college players may get selected over high school players due
to a shortened latency before reaching the majors and less variability in possible
career outcomes. Additionally, Little League rules in effect until 2006 operated on an
4
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August 1–July 31 year, meaning that, in their youth, players born on August 1 were
the eldest relative to their cohort. We test the hypotheses of whether teams have
undervalued certain players based on age differences.
The MLB Draft market is very different from many other professional sports for
a variety of reasons. Teams are not drafting for current need as they may in the
National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Football League (NFL),
but rather for 3-5 years down the road, as players must climb the ranks of the minor
leagues before making a major league roster. This latency leads to many unforeseen
outcomes for top draft prospects who may not develop as expected, sustain a severe
injury, or become blocked at the major league level by other more experienced players
already on the roster. On the positive side this extra time in the minor leagues could
lead to greater development than expected, where teams can reap returns on lower
round selections. Therefore, there is greater variability in the return on investment
in the MLB draft and we wish to shrink the gap by determining whether or not some
characteristics of players tend to be correlated with more or less career success.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present our literature review.
This includes papers on the relative age effect in general, the relative age effect in
baseball specifically, the relative age effect reversal, and market inefficiencies in the
June Amateur Draft. In section 3 we describe our data which includes all top 50
round draftees from 1987-2011. Section 3 also includes our methods and summary
statistics. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis. We use logistic regression,
zero inflated count regression techniques, generalized linear models and OLS to estimate the relationships between age and relative age with baseball career performance.
We also perform other analyses dealing with the traditional relative age effect and
possible market inefficiencies in the draft. In Section 5, we discuss our findings, in
particular whether we see the relative age effect, the relative age effect reversal and
over/under valuation of certain players. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks,
while section 7 suggests areas for future research. All figures and tables are provided
in the Appendix.
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Literature Review

Since the seminal paper by Barnsley, Thompson and Barnsley (1985) the relative age
effect (RAE) has been a hot topic of study in the sports world. Barnsley, et al. (1985)
find that there exists a strong relationship between the month of birth (from January
through December) and the proportion of players playing in the National Hockey
League (NHL). Using data from the 1982-83 NHL season, they show that nearly
twice as many players were born in the first three months of the year compared to
the last three months. Additionally, the RAE was more pronounced in two Canadian
junior hockey leagues, the Ontario Hockey League and the Western Hockey League,
where more than three times as many players were born in the first quarter compared
to the last quarter.
To explain this finding in hockey, Barnsley et al. (1985) suggest that the method of
grouping used in minor hockey (up to age 20) results in a developmental-age advantage
for those born in the early months of the sport year. For minor hockey league players,
the age cohorts correspond to the calendar year. The children born later in the
calendar year compete for a position against other children who, on average, bigger,
stronger and in general more developed physically. Accordingly, the relatively older
children will be given further advantages such as better coaching, more time on the
ice, placement on All-Star teams (which leads to play against better competition),
and more rewards and recognition since they are seen to be of higher status within
the local sporting community.
In baseball, Thompson, Barnsley and Stebelsky (1991) examined the birth months
of 837 major league baseball (MLB) players to see if there was a relationship between
relative age and participation at the MLB level. Additionally they re-examined data
from 1985, using 682 players, which had been previously determined to not exhibit
the relative age effect (Daniel and Jansen 1987). As opposed to hockey, where the
cutoff date for the pee wee level is January 1, the cutoff date in baseball is August 1.
Thus we would not expect a disproportionately high number of January, February and
March birthdays, but rather a disproportionately high number of August, September
6

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

and October birthdays. They use Spearman rank-order correlation between birth
month relative age rank (i.e. August is assigned a rank of 1 and July a rank of 12)
and birth month frequency rank (where the highest frequency of players is assigned
a rank of 1, the second highest was assigned a rank of 2, and so on). The findings
reflect the expected prior belief, that “there is a significant tendency for professional
players to have been born early in the baseball year”.
The reasoning for this result was that players born shortly after the cut-off date
were relatively older compared to their peers and thus more physically mature. Such
a developmental advantage gained by the relatively older players “when competing
against other youngsters who are considerably younger, although they are placed in
the same age category for league play” led to real effects where relatively older players
were deemed more talented (even though the skill level differences observed were most
likely due to age differences), thus receiving preferential treatment growing up from
coaches and exposure to opportunities not afforded to those of less physical maturity.
They find that the correlation here is not as strong as in hockey and suspect that this
is because “Little League baseball starts at a later age than hockey, thus reducing
the magnitude of the relative age effect”.
In addition to the initial studies on hockey and baseball, this same effect has
been deeply chronicled in minor league and professional hockey, and soccer as well
as observed in American football (Daniel and Janssen 1987, Glamser and Marciani
1992, Stanaway and Hines 1995), handball (Ryan 1989), swimming (Baxter-Jones
1995, Ryan 1989), tennis (Baxter-Jones 1995, Dudink 1994) and volleyball (Grondin
et al. 1984, Ryan 1989). More recently, Addona and Yates (2010) investigated the
RAE using complete data on every player who has ever played in the NHL, a total
of 6,407 players (birthday information was available for 6,391 of these players). They
made a case for when and why the RAE began to manifest itself in Canada. After
accounting for actual birth distributions, they find that “all evidence indicates that
the RAE is present for Canadian born players, regardless of whether we use a uniform
birth distribution or adjust for the actual birth distribution” confirming the long-held
belief that the RAE is present. Next, to pinpoint the year when the RAE began to
7
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materialize, Addona and Yates (2010) ran a change point analysis on the yearly
difference in proportion of first and last quarter births from 1930 to 1987. The results
indicated that the RAE was significantly present for players born since 1951, but not
before.
Although a prior study (Daniel and Janssen 1987) suggested that a potential transitional event which led to the RAE was the international hockey series between
Canada and the Soviet Union in 1972, Addona and Yates (2010) find that this is in
fact not the case. “If the RAE was present in the 1985-86 NHL season, then the vast
majority of these players were born in the early 1960s, or earlier, and went through
youth hockey before any effects of the 1972 series could have been experienced.” However, what they do find is that “all signs point to the series of events surrounding the
Soviets’ emergence on the international hockey scene in the early 1950s as the initial
catalyst for the RAE. The circumstances that led to the RAE were meant to lead to
the discovery of the best hockey talent in Canada” leading to relatively older players
receiving preferential treatment and being selected for the top youth teams, as they
were viewed at the time as the more talented players in their age groups. The RAE,
as a byproduct, led to a lot of wasted genuine hockey ability in the relatively younger
players who did not make it because of the extra training they did not receive.
Additionally, Addona and Yates (2010) find that there is no evidence of the RAE for
hall-of-fame status, suggesting that relatively older players, once they reach the NHL
do not continue to outperform their relatively younger peers. Therefore, even though
relatively older players are more likely to reach the NHL, they are not more likely to
enjoy exceptional careers as well. This provides an interesting topic of study which
we will explore further: do relatively older players not only make it to the professional
ranks more often, but also outperform their relatively younger peers throughout their
professional careers? This research question has received less attention, although a
recent paper by Deaner (2013) investigates whether older NHL players outperform
their younger counterparts even holding draft position constant.
In addition to the relative age effect, the literature presents the idea of the “rise
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of the underdog” and a relative age effect reversal, where even though players born
shortly before the cut-off date are disadvantaged growing up, leading them to be less
likely to reach the professional ranks, these relatively younger players turn out to
be more successful in the professional ranks compared to their relatively older peers.
Deaner (2013) tested whether or not selection bias occurs in the NHL Draft, with the
logic that “a player’s draft slot serves as a measure of their perceived talent whereas
career productivity indicates their realized talent. If selection bias occurs, then, for
any given draft slot, relatively younger players will enjoy more productive careers.”
The data collected for this study included players drafted over a 27 year span, ending
in 2007. The main productivity measure used for analysis was career games played
and as a second productivity measure they considered career points scored.
Using Tobit regression analysis, Deaner finds that “compared to first quarter draftees,
relatively younger draftees played more games” holding constant draft position. According to Deaner, this indicates that selection bias is indeed occurring because even
though relatively younger players were drafted somewhat earlier than relatively older
players, the regressions that controlled for draft position indicated that, given their
future performance, they were not drafted early enough. In grouping players into
birth month quartiles, the regressions indicated that a second quarter draftee played
the same number of games as a first quarter draftee who was selected 20 slots earlier.
Additionally, they tested to determine whether selection bias applies even to first
round draft choices, where more is known about players and “decisions are weighed
more carefully”. The results indicated that the selection bias was maintained, even
though the results were not statistically significant due to small sample size.
A cost Deaner (2013) associates with the observed selection bias is what is known
as escalation, where a player drafted later, who an organization has not invested as
much in, has to perform more than a player drafted earlier to receive equal playing
opportunities. They note, “the hockey data yielded evidence consistent with escalation: games played was jointly predicted by points per game and draft slot; crucially
the draft slot regression coefficient was negative. Furthermore, when position, height,
and plus-minus per game were added as predictors, the effect of draft slot remained
9
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substantial.” This may have serious consequences for the relatively younger players
whose talent is underestimated on draft day, as they may not receive the playing
opportunities that their talent warrants.
Regarding the relative age effect reversal (younger players outperforming relatively
older players), Gibbs (2011) finds–using data from 2000-2009–that the traditional
relative age effect (relatively older players outperforming relatively younger players)
exists moderately for the average Canadian NHL player, but reverses when examining
All-Star (2007-2009) and Olympic (1998-2010) team rosters. They find that “the
percent of all Canadian hockey players in the NHL born in the first three months
is a modest 28 percent” compared to previous results of 30-40 percent. Then upon
examination of the most elite levels of play in hockey, the RAE dwindles. We see
that of NHL All-Star rosters in 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively, only 20 percent,
15 percent, and 13 percent consist of Canadian-born players with birthdays in the
first three months of the year. These roster sizes are a small sample, but suggest that
relatively young players may be outperforming their relatively older counterparts.
This pattern can also be found among Canadian Olympians, as the 2010 gold medalwinning Canadian Olympic hockey team had 13 percent of its players born in January,
February or March. Similar results were seen in 2006, 2002 and 1998.
Gibbs (2011) does not conduct a formal analysis of whether the results are significantly different than the 28 percent observed overall, but rather simply says that
“it appears that being born at the start of the year reduces the chance of elite play.
Consider the average distribution of players born in the first quarter of the year for
the NHL Canadian-born players, 28 percent. The combined average of the All-stars
and Olympic rosters is 17 percent. This represents a 40 percent reduction in the
distribution of players born in the first three months of the year. If birth month had
no effect on elite play, the percentage would remain 28 percent.”
Additionally Gibbs (2011) finds that the average career of Canadian born NHL
players born later in the year is longer. In fact, they find that those born in the first
quarter of the year had a career duration of one season shorter than those born in the

10

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

last quarter of the year. As opposed to Wattie et al. (2007), which found no relative
age effect for NHL players when examining career length, Gibbs’ result indicates a
reverse relative age effect when examining the length of a player’s career. Gibbs
(2011) believes that this reverse relative age effect is a byproduct of the relatively
younger players continually being challenged by their more advanced relatively older
peers, where becoming an elite player comes from being the underdog and overcoming
the odds. The question then becomes why it takes until the elite levels of professional
hockey for this effect to be observed.
In addition to performance measures (career games and career points) and competing on the most elite level teams, we have observed that relatively younger players
have been selected earlier in drafts revealing that the relatively younger “players may
show superior performance compared with their relatively older peers” (Baker, 2007).
Even though we already noted that relatively younger players outperform their draft
position (Deaner, 2013) the evidence presented here provides insight into when the
reverse relative age effect may begin. The result here indicates that it may not be
only at the most elite level of play, but well before then, specifically for high school
and college aged players, as they prepare to be drafted. The fact that we still observe
some relative age effect in the NHL may be because of the extreme effect seen in
junior hockey where there are so few players born in the later months compared to
the early months. It may be that this is the only reason for observing that more
players in the NHL come from the early months of the year.
Baker (2007) examined 1,013 North American players drafted to play in the NHL
between 2000 and 2005. The results indicated that Canadian born players exhibited a
negative correlation between birth quartile and draft round number using Spearman
rank-order correlations. “Interestingly, these findings suggest that relatively younger
athletes are more likely to be chosen in the earlier rounds of the draft.” It is unclear
from this paper whether the relatively younger players are selected more often in the
earlier rounds of the NHL draft due to greater talent than their relatively older peers
in their cohort or due to the perceived ability to improve more in the future than
their relatively older peers due to anticipated development (i.e. the existence of an
11
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“aging curve”). As Deaner (2013) noted, since draftees can be both absolutely older
and relatively younger on draft day, it is likely to be the former.
Furthermore, Baümler (2000) finds that amongst the youngest soccer professionals
in Germany 68% are born in the first half of the soccer year. However, amongst
the oldest professionals we see that only 49% are born in the first half of the soccer
year. This is further evidence of the relative age effect reversal where even though
the relatively old make it more often to the professional ranks, the younger players
are those who enjoy more career success. Meanwhile, Williams (2010) found that the
RAE existed in the FIFA U17 World Cup for all geographical zones, except for Africa,
where the rosters of these teams were comprised of many players born in December.
They did not have a clear reason for this difference, but suggested that it could have
been due to recording or deliberate error, where many birth dates for children in this
region are not recorded and birth certificates are not readily available.
The RAE phenomenon has been recognized outside the sporting world. With
respect to education, relatively older students perform better in grade school, on
cognitive exams and attend college more often (Bedard and Dhuey 2006, Crawford et
al. 2007, Mayer and Knutson 1999). However, it is the relatively young individuals
who enjoy more academic success by graduating college with better degrees (Pellizzari
and Billari 2011, Russell and Startup 1986). Pellizari and Billari (2011) reconcile this
finding with the idea that starting school earlier is connected to better results in the
long-run (Fredriksson and Ockert 2005, Goodman and Sianesi 2005, Skirbekk 2005,
Skirbekk et al. 2004, Black et al. 2009). Cunha and Heckman 2007 suggest that early
investment in skills improves the return of future human capital investments. Due to
the inverse-U shape for the physiological profile of cognitive development (Salthouse
et al. 2004), the youngest in a cohort are penalized at early stages. However, given
this development curve, it is conceivable that such a disadvantage levels off, and
possibly reverses, at some later age. Some–Salthouse et al. (2004) and Jones (2005)–
even “suggest that the turning point in the profile of cognitive development might,
in fact, be between age 20 and 25 years,” fitting in very nicely with this reversal in
academic achievement at the university level.
12
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Age in the MLB Draft has also been researched dealing with a possible market
inefficiency in the ability of scouts to forecast the projected talent of MLB Draft
prospects. Jazayerli (2011) suggests that players who are young for their draft class
have been seemingly undervalued by professional scouts and organizations. Young
in this sense does not mean relatively young, but rather absolutely young. Absolute
age is the age of a player on a given day, say draft day. Given an average aging
curve–one would expect that all else constant–a younger player should outperform
an older player in the long run. Jazayerli claims that even though teams take into
consideration this predicted development, teams have significantly underestimated it,
leading to an inefficiency in the market.
Other potential market inefficiencies in the MLB Draft have been investigated
through the years, including whether certain positions have been overvalued relative
to others (Burger and Walters 2009, Salaga 2012), whether college players are better choices than high school players (Spurr 2000, Burger and Walters 2009, Lewis
2003, Bradbury 2011, Salaga 2012), whether certain teams are better at evaluating
talent than others (Spurr 2000), and whether the area a player is drafted out of has
a significant effect on career performance (Salaga 2012). The main results of these
studies were that at one time college draftees were undervalued compared to high
school draftees and hitters were undervalued relative to pitchers. However, teams
were not significantly different in their player evaluations and “players from any specific geographical location do not exhibit characteristics which would significantly
alter the odds of them reaching MLB as compared to a player from” New England (Salaga 2012). Additionally Wachter (2012) finds, using data from 2000-2005,
that college draftees are not uniformly superior to high school draftees. Specifically,
pre-arbitration (first three years in MLB) production, measured by wins above replacement (WAR) is greatest near the center of the defensive spectrum (OF, 3B).
Moreover, college draftees average more pre-arbitration production than high school
draftees at the more defensively demanding positions (2B, SS, 3B), while high school
draftees produce more than college draftees at less defensively demanding positions
(1B, OF) and pitcher.
13
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The current work fills a void in the literature, in that it seeks to analyze the effects
of both age and relative age on (1) draft selection, (2) chance of reaching MLB once
drafted, and (3) different measures of MLB success once drafted, including games
played at the major league level and wins above replacement (WAR). A comprehensive
analysis such as this one, spanning 25 years (1987-2011) and 50 rounds of draft data
per year, with major league statistics for all players who made the major leagues, has
not previously been carried out.

3
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3.1

Data

Baseball-Reference.com and TheBaseballCube.com have in depth information on every player to ever be selected in the June Draft. We gathered data for all players
drafted in the top 50 rounds of the June Draft from 1987-2011. We gathered information over this period, as 1987 was the first year that the June Draft was the only
draft where players were selected from high schools and colleges in the United States
and territories. Before 1987, other drafts included the June Secondary, January and
January Secondary Drafts. We collected data for players up until 2011, as very few
players drafted in 2012 reached the majors by June 2013. All performance data are as
of June 12, 2013 and gathered from Baseball-Reference.com. The relevant variables
here are Draft Year, Overall Pick Number, Position at the time of Draft, WAR, OPS,
Games and Type of School Drafted from (college, high school, junior college or other).
The relevant variables collected from TheBaseballCube.com are Draft Year, Overall
Draft Selection, Draft Round, Team Drafted by, HS State, Birth Day, Birth Month
and Birth Year.
We created a Last Time Drafted variable (lastDraf t) that is a dummy variable,
where 1 indicates that as of the 2011 Draft, this was the last time a player was drafted
in the top 50 rounds. We created this variable in order to account for signability issues
(e.g. players who either decide to attend college, as opposed to signing out of high
14
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school or decide to return to college for another year). We also created an age (in
years) variable that expresses how old the draft pick was on draft day. Additionally
we created a relativeage (in days) variable which expresses how relatively old given
an August 1 Little League cut-off date a player is, with 1 representing July 31 and
365 representing August 1. We shifted all values of WAR up by the minimum value
observed, plus .1, so that all values are positive, as we note that these values are
distributed lognormally (see Figure 1). We call this variable Wins Above Worst
Observed, but continue to refer to it as WAR throughout the rest of the paper.
We created multiple variables for transformations of overall draft selection, as it is
clear that the relationship between overall pick number and production (WAR and
Games) is not a linear relationship. The variables that we created are

1
1
, √pick
,
pick

log(pick) (see Figures 2 and 3). We created a dummy variable called pitcher that is
a 1 if the player was drafted as a pitcher and 0 if the player was drafted as a position
player, to differentiate between the evaluation of pitchers versus hitters.
There were some discrepancies in birth dates between Baseball-Reference and The
Baseball Cube. For most players we used the birth date on Baseball Cube, but when
it was clear that this birth date was incorrect, we used the Baseball-Reference birth
date (if that was determined to be correct). Additionally, if we could not find a
clear correct birthdate, we treated this player as missing. We manually checked (and
changed if necessary) the top 5 rounds of each year and found approximately 2% of
birth dates to be incorrect using The Baseball Cube data, thus we expect around
this percent error in our results. We also checked highly potentially incorrect birth
dates, i.e. players who were listed as under 17 or older than 24 on draft day and made
corrections and omissions here when necessary.
We also used the draft order reported by The Baseball Cube, as there were some
discrepancies between this source and Baseball-Reference.

For the discrepancies

we checked a third party source, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/draft/draft.jsp,
“First-Year Player Draft History: June Amateur Draft” and determined the correct
order accordingly.
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Methods

The first stage of this research was to determine whether we observe the traditional
relative age effect in the MLB Draft and MLB both graphically and analytically
using chi-square goodness-of-fit tests (see Table 2 Figures 4 and 5). Once this was
determined, we proceeded to examine the relationship between performance once
drafted and age. To do this, we used four measures of baseball career performance:
whether the player reached the majors, career number of games played at the major
league level, career WAR and career OPS (for players drafted as position players
only). We note that this is a two stage process, whereby a player must first reach the
majors to be able to accumulate statistics. Thus, we use the generalized linear model,
logistic regression, to determine the probability of reaching the majors modeled by
age, relativeage,

√1 ,
pick

pitcher, factor(year), and lastDraf t.

After modeling the probability of reaching the major leagues, we continue on to
MLB performance statistics, beginning with games played at the major league level.
We model games by the same variables: age, relativeage,

√1 ,
pick

pitcher, factor(year),

and lastDraf t. However, games is not continuous, but rather a special type of
discrete random variable known as a count. Thus, we must use count regression
techniques. We observe that there are two problems with the data: the presence of
overdispersion and excess zeros. Overdispersion is the presence of greater variability
in the data than would be expected given a certain distribution. Therefore, we cannot
use a Poisson distribution (typically used in count models) which has the property
that the mean equals the variance. So, we use a negative binomial distribution, which
is similar to the Poisson distribution without the restriction of the mean equaling the
variance.
To account for the excess zeros problem we must use zero inflated or zero truncated
models, such as the hurdle negative binomial model and the zero inflated negative
binomial model. Both of these regression techniques are two stage processes, first
estimating the chance of a zero (for the hurdle model the results are identical to
the logistic regression discussed above) and then the chance of some non-negative
16
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integer. The difference between the models is that the hurdle model conditions its
count estimates on the variable not being a zero, whereas the zero inflated model reuses the zeros in its estimates, while controlling for the fact that there are an excess
amount of zeros. Therefore, the hurdle model asks the questions, did you reach the
majors and then given that you reached the majors how many games did you play?
Whereas the zero inflated negative binomial model asks, did you reach the majors and
how many games did you play (allowing the possibility of a zero for players reaching
the majors)?
Formally, the density of the hurdle model can be written as:

 f (0; z, γ)
zero
fhurdle (y; x, z, β, γ) =
 (1 − f (0; z, γ))
zero

if y = 0
fcount (y;x,β)
(1−fcount (0;x,β))

(1)

if y > 0,

where y represents games played, fzero is the binomial probability function and fcount
is the negative binomial probability function. The covariates in the count model,
x, can be different from the covariates in the binomial model, z, if the factors influencing getting over the hurdle are different from those influencing the count once
over the hurdle. In our analyses, however, we use the same covariates in each model,
so x = z. The model parameters β and γ are estimated by maximum likelihood,
where the hurdle and count components can be maximized separately. Since fcount
is the negative binomial probability function, a dispersion parameter is estimated
which distinguishes this from Poisson regression. This parameter is also estimated by
maximum likelihood.
Due to the truncated zeros in the count model, interpretation of the coefficients is
difficult compared with standard count regression. We now elaborate on this point
briefly, since much of the applied work which employ these models do not make this
clear. The Negative Binomial distribution with parameters k and r can be written
as follows:
P (r) =

(k + r − 1)!
pr
(r = 0, 1, . . . ; p > 0; k ≥ 1).
(k − 1)!r! (1 + p)k+r

(2)

We observe that the expected value using the parametrization in (2) is kp. We also
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note that
P (0) =

1
,
(1 + p)k

(3)

thus we must divide equation (2) by equation (3) to find the truncated negative
binomial distribution used in equation (1). First, we let
ω=

1
and η = 1 − ω.
1+p

We find that the truncated negative binomial distribution, Pt (r), has the form
Pt (r) =

ω k (k + r − 1)! r
η (r = 1, 2, . . . ; k ≥ 1; ω, η ∈ (0, 1)),
1 − ω k (k − 1)!r!

with expected value

(4)

kη
.
ω(1−ω k )

Negative binomial count models are built for the parameter k. In standard Negative
Binomial regression, we observe that if k = exp(Xβ), then E(R) = exp(Xβ)p, which
represents a constant multiplicative change in the mean by exp(βi ) for 1 unit increases
of xi ∈ X. However, the truncated negative binomial model does not possess this
property, as
E(Rt ) =

exp(Xβ)η
,
ω(1 − ω exp(Xβ) )

(5)

which we can easily verify has a rate of change with respect to xi ∈ X that is not
independent of the values of xi . Consequently, there is no simple interpretation of
βi . In our subsequent results, we report coefficient values, and for simplicity, report
exp(βi ) as an approximation of the multiplicative change in the mean for 1 unit
increases of xi .
We next consider WAR. Since WAR is distributed lognormally, we cannot employ
OLS regression. We observe that we can use generalized linear models using this
distribution. Again, we use the same explanatory variables: age, relativeage,

√1 ,
pick

pitcher, factor(year), and lastDraf t.
OPS, unlike WAR, is distributed normally, thus we can use OLS regression using
the same explanatory variables as above. The issue here is that some players who
were drafted as hitters were converted to pitchers. This creates the issue where we
have many values close to zero which should not be part of the distribution. We
18
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also then have the problem of pitchers who were converted to hitters, who are not
captured in these regressions, even though they theoretically should be.
We briefly look into the proportion of high school and college players drafted over
time (see Figure 6) and whether there exists a breakpoint. Additionally, we examine
whether there are differing age and relative age effects over time. We also explore
other questions presented in the literature including whether certain teams are better
at evaluating talent than others, whether certain positions have been undervalued in
the draft, whether certain regions have been undervalued and whether college draft
choices are better selections than high school players.

3.3

Summary Statistics

Summary statistics for variables included in our analyses can be found in Table 1
(this does not include variables that we include as categorical such as year). Some
stats of note include the low minimum age and high maximum age. Even though the
ages seem extreme, we observe that the players on the high end are mostly players
drafted out of Cuba, which makes sense, as it is unlikely that a player drafted out
of college in the United States would be almost 28 years old. On the young end, we
see that these players are mostly from outside of the United States, including, Puerto
Rico, Cuba, while some are from high school’s in the United States. Since most of
these players were not drafted out of high school or college, they are not included in
our analyses.
A few other summary statistics of note are that only 12.48% of all drafted players
reached the majors, while the average WAR and median WAR were 4.947 and 4.5
respectively. We shifted WAR by 4.5, since the worst observed WAR was −4.4. This
was done in order to make all WAR values positive. Thus, we see that the median
WAR value was actually no better than replacement level, whereas the average WAR
was .4 better than replacement.
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Results

4.1

Distribution of Birth Months for Drafted Players

Figure 4 presents a histogram for the birth month distribution of all top 50 round
MLB draftees from 1987-2011. Moreover, Table 2 illustrates the observed frequencies
of birth months for draftees compared with theoretical frequencies based on uniform
births and observed births in the United States from 1995-2002 (James, 2005). Using
both the uniform distribution and theoretical distribution given observed births in the
U.S., the chi-square goodness-of-fit test reveals that the observed distribution of the
birth months of draftees was significantly different from both of these (p < 2.2e − 16).

4.2

High School: Games Results

Using total games played as a measure of career success, we find consistent results
between two count regression models, hurdle with negative binomial distribution and
zero inflated negative binomial (see Tables 3 and 4). We note that the correlation of
lastDraf t with games played does not alter the main results over the top 5, 10 and
50 rounds, thus we shall examine the models not including lastDraf t. Over the top
5 rounds we observe that both age and relative age are negatively, but statistically
insignificantly correlated with total games played (see Tables 4 (i) and 3 (i)). We note
that using the hurdle model (see Table 3 (i)), a player one year older than another on
draft day played in 92.46% (p = 0.5076) of the games that the younger one played in
over the course of their careers. Additionally, a player 100 days older relatively than
another played in 94.38% (p = 0.2239) of the games the younger player played in over
the course of their careers. For a 1000 game career, this difference is approximately
56 games, only about one third of a full 162 game season.
Furthermore, we note that over the top 5 rounds

√1
pick

is positively correlated

(p < .001) with games played (see Table 3 (i)). The results indicate that a .1 unit
increase in

√1
pick

is correlated with an increase in games played by 19.12% (see Table

3 (i)). This means that holding all else constant, a player drafted with the 25 overall
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pick played in 19.12% more games than a player selected at 100th overall. If the
100th pick played in 1000 career games, then the 25th pick played in 1191 games,
over a full season more games. We also see that being as a pitcher has a negative
relationship (p < .001) with a player’s total games played (see Table 3 (i)). Holding
all else constant, a player drafted as a pitcher played in 29.89% of the games of a
hitter. Over a 162 game season (assuming a position player plays every game), a
pitcher would be expected to pitch in approximately 48 games. This makes sense, as
the typical starting pitcher will pitch in 32 games in a season, while the typical relief
pitcher will throw in 70 games; the average of which is 51.
As aforementioned, the results using the zero inflated negative binomials were concurrent with the results using the hurdle model. We observe that a player one year
older than another on draft day played 8.10% (p = 0.4803) fewer games over the
course of their careers (see Table 4 (i)). For a 1000 game career, a player one year
older on draft day would be expected to play in 81 fewer games, exactly one half of a
full major league season. Moreover, a player 100 days older relatively played in 5.63%
(p = 0.2277) fewer games over the course of their careers (see Table 4 (i)). This implies that if a player 100 days relatively younger than another played in 1000 games,
the relatively older player would play in 56 fewer games. The results for pitcher and
√1
pick

did not change from the hurdle model.

For both the hurdle and zero inflated models, we used negative binomial distributions as opposed to Poisson distributions due to overdispersion, which is the presence
of greater variability in a data set than would be expected. This was an appropriate
choice, as we see the coefficient on Log(theta) is significant (p < .001) for both models
(see Tables 3 (i) and 4 (i)) indicating the presence of overdispersion given a Poisson
distribution. Furthermore, the results for the top 10 and 50 rounds of the draft compared to the top 5 rounds do not change any of the main findings significantly for
either the hurdle or zero inflated models (see Tables 3, 4 and 5).
The results for the probability of reaching the majors for players drafted in the
top 5 and 10 rounds using the hurdle and zero inflated negative binomial models are
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reported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. We note that the results are the same for the
two types of models and thus we examine on the hurdles models in depth here. We
see that relative age and age both have negative and significant relationships with
the odds of making the majors. Over the top 5 rounds, the results suggest that a
player one year older than another on draft day had 30.88% lower odds of reaching
the major leagues (p = 0.0038). We also find that a player 100 days relatively older
than another had 10.78% lower odds of playing in MLB (p = 0.0326). Additionally,
we note that a .1 unit increase of

√1
pick

(i.e. the 100th pick to the 25th pick) was

correlated with a 70% increase in the odds of reaching MLB. Also, of note we see that
the coefficient on pitcher flipped from negative in the count model to positive in the
probability model, suggesting that even though pitchers play in fewer games at the
major league level, they are more likely to reach the majors.
Again, we note that the main results do not change if we look at the top 10 rounds
compared with the top 5 rounds, except that the coefficients on age and pitcher
become more significant over the top 10 rounds (page < .001, ppitcher < .001) (see Table
6 (ii)). Furthermore, the top 50 rounds results are identical to the top 10 rounds,
suggesting that the results are robust to changes in the draft rounds considered (see
Tables 6 and 8). In addition, the main results are robust to the inclusion of lastDraf t
(see Tables 6 (iii) and 6 (iv)).

4.3

High School: WAR Results

We have already estimated the probability of reaching the majors and now that we
have used games played as a measure of career success, we will also use WAR to
estimate the relationships between age and relative age and MLB performance given
that you have made the majors. We observe that the correlation of lastDraf t with
WAR does not change the main results over the top 5, 10 and 50 rounds, thus we only
examine the models not including lastDraf t. Over the top 5 rounds of the draft (see
Table 9 (i)) we note that a player 100 days relatively older than another produced
95.14% of the WAR of the younger player (p = .106). Furthermore, a player one year
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older than another on draft day produced 89.28% of the WAR of the younger player
(p = .141). We note that a .1 unit increase of

√1
pick

(i.e. the 100th pick to the 25th

pick) was correlated with a 18.81% increase in WAR (p < .001). We observe that
pitchers produced 92.89% of the WAR that position players produced (p = .242).
Over the top 10 rounds (see Table 9 (ii)) we see that a player 100 days relatively
older than another produced 94.88% of the WAR of the younger player (p = .0436).
In addition, a player one year older than another on draft day produced 93.56% of
the WAR of the younger player (p = .264). Similar to our other results, we note that
a .1 unit increase of

√1
pick

(i.e. the 100th pick to the 25th pick) was correlated with a

17.57% increase in WAR (p < .001). We also see that pitchers produced 91.49% of
the WAR that position players produced (p = .100).
Over the top 50 rounds (see Table 9 (iii)) we observe that a player 100 days relatively
older than another produced 97.63% of the WAR of the younger player (p = .149).
Additionally, a player one year older than another on draft day produced 95.80% of
the WAR of the younger player (p = .269). Moreover, we observe that a .1 unit
increase of

√1
pick

(i.e. the 100th pick to the 25th pick) was correlated with a 16.75%

increase in WAR (p < .001). We note that pitchers produced 91.95% of the WAR
that position players produced (p = .0163).

4.4

High School: OPS Results (Position Players Only)

Thus far we have only examined career total statistics. Here we take a closer look
at a career average statistic: on-base plus slugging percentage (OPS). We weight the
observationss by the number of career at-bats. We note that the data are normally
distributed (see Figure 7) so we may simply use OLS regression. Additionally, OPS is
not a good measure of success for pitchers, thus we limit ourselves to only examining
hitters. The results for these regressions are reported in Table 10. The main results
for the regressions that include lastDraf t are the same as those which do not (see
Table 10), thus we only discuss the regressions which do not include lastDraf t. We
also note that the results do not change much over the top 5, 10 and 50 rounds, thus
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we only comment on the top 5 round regression here. We observe that a player 100
days relatively older than another produced .00038 less OPS (p = 0.9303) during their
careers. Additionally, we note that a player one year older than another on draft day
produced .008411 less OPS (p = 0.4646) over their careers. We also observe that a
.1 unit increase in

√1
pick

(i.e. the 100th to the 25th pick) was correlated with a .0122

unit increase in OPS (p < .001).

4.5

College: Games Results

Using total games played as the response variable, we again find consistent results
between two count regression models, hurdle with negative binomial distribution and
zero inflated negative binomial (see Tables 11, 12 and 13). Given this finding, we
shall only report here on the hurdle model results (see Tables 11, 12 and 13 for full
results). We note that the relationship between lastDraf t and games played has no
significant effect on the main regression coefficients. Thus, we only report here on
those regressions not including lastDraf t.
There is no significant relationship between relative age and games played. Interestingly, the coefficient on relative age is consistently positive (see Table 11). This is
contrary to the results found for high school players, where the coefficients on relative
age were consistently negative (see Table 3). In neither case were the coefficients
significant; however it is of note that the coefficients have different signs based on
type (i.e. High School vs. College) and that these signs are consistent throughout
changes to the number of draft rounds considered. For college draftees selected in the
top 5 rounds we see that a player 100 days relatively older than another played in
.17% more games than the relatively younger player (see Table 11). For a 1000 game
career, this difference is almost negligible at approximately 2 games.
We note that the coefficient on age is consistently negative, similar to our count
regression results for high school players. Additionally, we see that there is no significant relationship between age and games played for the top 5 and 10 rounds. Over the
top 5 rounds, a player one year older than another played in 99.48% of the games the
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younger player played. Over a 1000 game career for the younger player, this would
result in approximately a 5 game difference, which is negligible. If we consider the
top 10 rounds we see that this difference jumps to 89 games, which is fairly large, at
over a half a season. In addition, we see borderline significance (.01 < p < .05) on
age in all top 50 rounds regressions with a difference of 96 games over a 1000 game
career (see Table 13).
Similar to the results for high school players, the coefficients on

√1
pick

were con-

sistently positive (p < .001). We note that for top 5 round draft choices, a .1 unit
increase in

√1
pick

(i.e. the 100th pick to the 25th pick) was correlated with a 13.72%

increase in games played. This implies that if a player selected at 100th overall played
in 1000 games, a player selected at 25th overall would be expected to play in 1137
games, nearly a full season more.
Additionally, we observe that being a pitcher was negatively (p < .001) correlated
with games played. Considering top 5 round draft choices, pitchers played in 32.92%
of the games of position players. Over a 162 game season (assuming the position
player competed in every game) a pitcher would be expected to play in 53 games,
which is again roughly the average number of games in which starting and relief
pitchers appear. Given this result, it appears as though college pitchers on average
play in more games than high school pitchers (see Tables 3 and 11). These results
are consistent if we consider the top 10 and 50 rounds as well (see Tables 5 and
11). Furthermore, due to overdispersion, we observe that it was appropriate to use
the negative binomial distribution as opposed to the poisson distribution, as the
coefficient on log(theta) was significant on all regressions (p < .001) (see Tables 11,
12 and 13).
The results for the probability of reaching the majors for players drafted in the
top 5 and 10 rounds using the hurdle and zero inflated negative binomial models are
reported in Tables 14 and 15 respectively. The results are identical across the type of
model used, thus we report here on the hurdle model results. Moreover, the results
do not change with the inclusion of lastDraf t, thus we only report on regressions
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not including lastDraf t. Over the top 5 rounds we see negative coefficients and
borderline significance for both the age and relative age variables. We note that a
player one year older on draft day had 85.13% of the odds of reaching the major
leagues of the younger player. We also observe that a player one year older on draft
day had 91.95% of the odds of reaching the major leagues of the relatively younger
player. Over the top 5 rounds we also note that a .1 unit increase in

√1
pick

(i.e. the

100th pick to the 25th pick) is associated with a 132.88% increase in the odds of making
the majors (p < .001). Further, we observe that pitchers had 72.02% of the odds of
reaching the majors of a position player.
Over the top 10 rounds we see that the effects of age and pitcher change moderately,
while the remainder of the results remain consistent. The magnitude of the coefficient
on age increased, revealing that a player one year older on draft day had 82.17% of the
odds of reaching the majors of the one year younger player (p = .0015). Additionally,
pitcher is now only borderline significant (p = .074) with pitchers having 87.69% of
the odds of reaching the majors of position players.
Over the top 50 rounds we again see an increase in the magnitude of the coefficient
on age, as a player one year older than another on draft day had 70.87% (p < .001)
the odds of the younger player of making the majors. Another interesting result we
see over the top 50 rounds is that being drafted as a pitcher is significantly associated
with an improvement of a draftee’s odds of reaching the major leagues. We previously
observed this result for high school players, but did not for college players over the
top 5 and 10 rounds. For college players over the top 50 rounds we note that a pitcher
was 13.52% more likely to reach the majors than a position player (p = .014).

4.6

College: WAR Results

Using WAR as the response variable for college players, we note that the main results
do not change with the inclusion of lastDraf t. Accordingly, we only consider regressions that do not include lastDraf t. Additionally, the results are the same over the
top 5 and 10 rounds and only differ over the top 50 rounds in an increased signifi26

4.7 College: OPS Results (Position Players Only)

4 RESULTS

cance of pitcher. Thus, we only examine the top 5 rounds regression. Our regressions
(see Table 17) show that a player 100 days relatively older than another produced
100.84% of the WAR of the younger player (p = .688). Furthermore, a player one
year older than another on draft day produced 96.97% of the WAR of the younger
player (p = .490). Additionally, we note that a .1 unit increase of

√1
pick

(i.e. the

100th pick to the 25th pick) was correlated with a 12.98% increase in WAR (p < .001).
We note that pitchers produced 90.12% of the WAR that position players produced
(p = .0196). .

4.7

College: OPS Results (Position Players Only)

Using OPS weighted by at-bats as a measure of career success, we observe that the
regression results do not change with inclusion of lastDraf t (see Table 18); thus, we
only report on regressions that do not include lastDraf t. There are also only small
differences when examining the top 5, 10 and 50 rounds, so we only look at the top
5 rounds here. The regression results suggest that a player 100 days relatively older
than another produced .01126 more OPS over their careers (p = .00411). The results
show that a player one year older than another on draft day produced .00458 less
OPS (p = .61365) over the course of their careers. We also find that a .1 unit increase
in

√1
pick

(i.e. the 100th pick to the 25th pick) was correlated with a .0105 unit increase

in OPS (p < .001).

4.8

Other Results

We note that the proportion of high school and college draftees was pretty similar
from the late 1980s until 2000, but then beginning in 2001 we begin to see a large
increase in the proportion of college players selected, with 2003 and 2004 representing
large discrepancies in this proportion. We note that this trend has continued to date,
however the effect has dampened over time. Using breakpoint analysis, we find that
the most likely break is 2000, suggesting that after this year the results were different
than before, meaning significantly more college players were selected over high school
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players in the 2000s.
We looked into the possibility of changing relative age and age effects over time
and found no consistent evidence corresponding to such effects. Some other results
we looked into were whether certain teams were better at evaluating talent than
others, whether certain regions produce better talent than others relative to their
draft position and whether college or high school draft selections were better and we
find no significant results across all of these tests. If we do not hold draft position
constant, we note that age and relativeage are negative and borderline significant;
we also find no difference in draft position for young and old (absolutely or relatively)
players.

4.9

Summary of Main Results

1. More relatively old players are drafted by MLB teams.
2. More relatively old players play in MLB because more are drafted: the relatively
young players reach MLB at significantly higher rate.
3. The results using Games, WAR, and OPS suggest there are no significant differences in MLB performance based on age or relative age for high school draftees.
4. Young and relatively young college draftees reach MLB at a higher rate.
5. Once in MLB there is no difference in performance as measured by Games and
WAR for college draftees based on age or relative age.
6. There is evidence that the traditional relative age effect occurs at the MLB level
with respect to OPS for college draftees.
7. College and high school players were selected at the same rates until the early
2000s, when college players began to be selected more often.
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We find that there exists strong evidence for the relative age effect in the MLB draft.
We see the majority of draftees have birth days in first few months of the Little League
year, which began on August 1 up until 2006. This result is consistent for high school
as well as college draftees across rounds. Aside from being consistent throughout our
results, the results follow prior literature on the topic, suggesting that the relative
age effect exists in MLB (Thompson, Barnsley and Stebelsky, 1991).
With respect to our regression results, we note that for high school players there
appears to be a significant relative age effect reversal (and for college players this result
is borderline significant) on the odds of reaching the major leagues. It is possible that
this is due to what has been described as the underdog effect, where the relatively
young players have had to work harder their whole lives to be as good as the relatively
older players and this propels the player to higher talent levels.
Another possible explanation is one more related to the relative age effect. Take
for example a relatively young player who struggles to compete against his relatively
older counterparts; he may drop out of playing ball at a young age, which is one
of the explanations for the relative age effect. But take that same relatively young
player and say he enjoys success at a young age playing against his relatively older
peers. Now, this player will be unlikely to drop out. Given that he enjoyed success
as a younger player it is likely that he is more naturally talented. Thus, he continues
to play and is more talented, so he is more likely to make the majors.
Then, the problem arises as to why this does not continue at the major league level.
As we observe from our games, WAR and OPS regressions there does not appear to
be a relative age effect reversal at the major league level. This means that given that
a player has reached the majors, he is about equally as talented as all other players.
Why would this be the case? We will explore this question in short order.
Furthermore, not only do relatively young players make the majors more often, but
absolutely young players as well. This result can be more easily explained. If a player
is drafted as an 18 year old out of high school and begins his pro career in rookie ball–
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which is a fairly regular occurrence–he is likely to be young for his level. If he enjoys
success at this level, great, he can be promoted to A ball. Now, take for example the
same 18 year old who struggles in rookie ball. Since he is young for his level he may
be given an opportunity the next year to try to prove himself worthy by repeating the
level–getting a second chance. If another player were 19 years old when drafted and
placed in rookie ball and struggled, the team would be less willing to let the player
have another opportunity and he may quickly move down the organizational depth
chart at his position. Thus, a player who is younger when drafted may be given extra
opportunities in the minors, enabling them to reach the majors more often.
Moreover, we again see that absolute age has no significant relationship with performance once a player has reached the majors. So, again we ask, why would this
be the case? It seems to be that there is some talent level that a player must have
to reach the majors, but then after the player has reached the majors everyone is
fairly similar and differences in age and relative age do not make much of a difference
anymore.
Additionally, with respect to the original Moneyball drafting philosophy of college
over high school players, we note that during the Moneyball era (early 2000s), the
proportion of high school to college draftees dropped considerably. However, it appears as though there was an over correction in the market–too many college players
were selected–as the difference has come down some in more recent drafts.

6

Conclusion

We find that the relative age effect does indeed exist in the MLB Draft. Further, we
can conclude that even though more relatively older players reach the major leagues
this is only due to the larger proportion of relatively old players drafted. We see that
a statistically significant proportion of those who are drafted and reach the majors
are relatively young, suggesting evidence for the RAE reversal. However, given that
a player reaches the majors we find no evidence that relatively old players perform
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differently than relatively young players. Similarly, we find that given that a player
has been drafted, the younger the player is, the more likely he is to reach the majors.
But, given that the player has reached the majors, young and old players appear to
perform on similar levels. This is similar to other results that suggest that relative
age effects disappear at the highest levels of athletics. Addona and Yates (2010) find
that even though the RAE was present in the NHL across all positions, the RAE
was not evident for hall of fame players. Here we note that the RAE is present for
drafted players, there is an RAE reversal for the odds of reaching the majors, but no
difference at the MLB level.

7

Future Research

Given our current work and previous research on these topics, we believe that there
are a few key questions that remained unanswered and deserve further consideration.
Namely, we would have liked to have a status variable to indicate whether a player
was still active, to be able to take advantage of survival analysis regression techniques.
We do not have a variable that indicates whether a player was drafted as a college
junior or senior, making it so that the age variable could get a little tricky, as we
are comparing across classes. Older players in college could be college seniors, who
are generally less talented than college juniors drafted, but we also control for being
drafted again and there is no difference. So, if you are drafted late as a junior
and return to school and then get selected earlier as a senior due to signability, this
variation is captured by lastDraf t. Since, the age coefficient is not significant anyway,
this is not much of an issue.
Additionally, we would like to look into different transformations of WAR instead of
the shift that we use. There are estimation issues with using simply WAR or shifting
all the negative values to 0 or taking the logarithm of WAR, which were some of the
transformations considered.
We would also like a variable to compare pitchers besides WAR. We found that
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WHIP was promising, but we do not have a total career innings variable to account
for the difference between pitchers who pitched for a long time compared to those
who only got a “cup of coffee” in the majors. We also do not have a games started
variable to compare starters and relievers.
Furthermore, we would like to use an ordered probit type of analysis to determine
when exactly the relative age effect reversal occurs between draft day and reaching
the majors. At present, we only observe that it occurs sometime between draft day
and the MLB level. However, it may not truly be at the MLB level, as it could occur
at AA, but we only observe it at the MLB level in our results. This is similar to how
one would believe that the relative age effect is occurring at the MLB level if we did
not have data on players drafted, where we clearly see the effect is much larger.
Finally, we would like to track the changes in the composition of draftees, as new
Little League rules–as of 2006–have an age cutoff of May 1. We would expect over the
next few years to see an influx of May, June and July draftees, compared to what we
observe here, i.e. that the majority of players have birth days in August, September
and October.
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Figure 1: Histogram of WAR for players who played at least 1 game in the Majors
and were drafted in the top 5 rounds out of HS
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Figure 2: WAR by Draft Round, blue =
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√1 ,
pick
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Figure 3: Games Played by Draft Round, blue =
1
pick
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Figure 4: Histogram of Birth Months for top 50 round draftees from 1987-2011
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Figure 5: Histogram of Birth Months for top 50 round picks who reached the Major
Leagues
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Figure 6: Proportion of High School (triangles) and College (solid circles) draft selections
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Figure 7: OPS for top 5 round draftees, selected as position players who played more
than 20 games at the major league level
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Variable

Min.

1st Qu.

Median

Mean

3rd Qu.

Max.

NA’s

Age (in Years)

16.52

18.53

20.43

20.2

21.7

27.83

3327

Relative Age

1

107

204

196.9

291

365

3327

Pitcher

0

0

1

0.5042

1

1

–

√1
pick

0.0256

0.0306

0.0375

0.0520

0.053

1

29

lastDraft

0

1

1

0.8262

1

1

–

Games

0

0

0

31.56

0

2850

–

WAR

0.1

4.5

4.5

4.947

4.5

120

–

OPS

0

0.25

0.55

0.49

0.71

4

31932

Reach MLB

0

0

0

0.1248

0

1

0

Table 1: Summary Statistics for top 50 Round Draftees from 1987-2011
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2582
2332
2583
2427
2421
2238
2220
3398
3324
2967
2863
2845

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

0.0884

0.0889

0.0921

0.103

0.106

0.0689

0.0695

0.0752

0.0754

0.0802

0.0724

0.0802

Relative Frequency

0.085

0.082

0.085

0.082

0.085

0.085

0.082

0.085

0.082

0.085

0.077

0.085

Theoretical Frequency (Uniform)

0.0831

0.0799

0.0851

0.0865

0.0888

0.0880

0.0830

0.0844

0.0801

0.0835

0.0761

0.0815

Theoretical Frequency (Observed U.S. Births)

Table 2: Birth Month Frequencies for Top 50 Round Draftees from 1987-2011
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Month
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

7.408 ∗ ∗∗

8.163 ∗ ∗∗

7.317 ∗ ∗∗

8.051 ∗ ∗∗

(2.183)

(1.911)

(2.192)

(1.918)

−0.000578

−0.000670

−0.000570

−0.000674

(0.000475)

(0.000423)

(0.000475)

(0.000422)

−0.0784

−0.117

−0.0774

−0.116

(0.118)

(0.105)

(0.118)

(0.105)

1.749 ∗ ∗∗

1.744 ∗ ∗∗

1.724 ∗ ∗∗

1.677 ∗ ∗∗

(0.374)

(0.354)

(0.377)

(0.358)

−1.208 ∗ ∗∗

−1.238 ∗ ∗∗

−1.209 ∗ ∗∗

−1.245 ∗ ∗∗

(0.100)

(0.0898)

(0.101)

(0.0900)

–

–

0.0800

0.135

–

–

(0.173)

(0.130)

−0.325 ∗ ∗∗

−0.388 ∗ ∗∗

−0.325 ∗ ∗∗

−0.386 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0592)

(0.0529)

(0.0592)

(0.0529)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Log(theta)

Table 3: High School Games Hurdle Count Models: (i) Top 5 rounds (ii) Top 10
rounds (iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds with lastDraft. Standard
Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

7.541 ∗ ∗∗

8.298 ∗ ∗∗

7.446 ∗ ∗∗

8.190 ∗ ∗∗

(2.211)

(1.952)

(2.222)

(1.961)

−0.000579

−0.000689

−0.000570

−0.000696

(0.000480)

(0.000433)

(0.000480)

(0.000432)

−0.0845

−0.122

−0.0839

−0.123

(0.120)

(0.107)

(0.120)

(0.107)

1.648 ∗ ∗∗

1.504 ∗ ∗∗

1.613 ∗ ∗∗

1.421 ∗ ∗∗

(0.382)

(0.350)

(0.385)

(0.352)

−1.212 ∗ ∗∗

−1.251 ∗ ∗∗

−1.214 ∗ ∗∗

−1.260 ∗ ∗∗

(0.102)

(0.0921)

(0.102)

(0.0924)

–

–

0.0929

0.156

–

–

(0.175)

(0.133)

−0.345 ∗ ∗∗

−0.436 ∗ ∗∗

−0.347 ∗ ∗∗

−0.438 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0625172)

(0.0564109)

(0.0626689)

(0.0565554)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Log(theta)

Table 4: High School Games Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Count Models: (i) Top
5 rounds (ii) Top 10 rounds (iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds with
lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

8.023 ∗ ∗∗

8.020 ∗ ∗∗

8.226 ∗ ∗∗

8.389 ∗ ∗∗

(1.369)

(1.369)

(1.429)

(1.463)

−0.000266

−0.000266

−0.000333

−0.000358

(0.000315)

(0.000315)

(0.000329)

(0.000337)

−0.102

−0.102

−0.112

−0.121

(0.0752)

(0.0752)

(0.0785)

(0.0804)

1.844 ∗ ∗∗

1.855 ∗ ∗∗

1.401 ∗ ∗∗

1.217 ∗ ∗∗

(0.316)

(0.343)

(0.305)

(0.324)

−1.111 ∗ ∗∗

−1.111 ∗ ∗∗

−1.142 ∗ ∗∗

−1.156 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0673)

(0.0673)

(0.0706)

(0.0723)

–

−0.00637

–

0.0345

–

(0.0740)

–

(0.0790)

−0.517 ∗ ∗∗

−0.517 ∗ ∗∗

−0.622 ∗ ∗∗

−0.680 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0401)

(0.0401)

(0.0463)

(0.0483)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Log(theta)

Table 5: High School Top 50 Round Games Count Models: (i) Hurdle Model (ii)
Hurdle Model with lastDraft (iii) Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model (iv) Zero
Inflated Negative Binomial Model with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

5.903∗

5.366 ∗ ∗

5.953∗

5.515 ∗ ∗

(2.339)

(1.814)

(2.342)

(1.818)

−0.00114∗

−0.000921∗

−0.00114∗

−0.000888∗

(0.000534)

(0.000429)

(0.000534)

(0.000429)

−0.369 ∗ ∗

−0.361 ∗ ∗∗

−0.367 ∗ ∗

−0.357 ∗ ∗∗

(0.128)

(0.0988)

(0.128)

(0.0990)

5.317 ∗ ∗∗

7.261 ∗ ∗∗

5.362 ∗ ∗∗

7.455 ∗ ∗∗

(0.643)

(0.609)

(0.648)

(0.618)

0.242∗

0.318 ∗ ∗∗

0.241∗

0.317 ∗ ∗∗

(0.107)

(0.0886)

(0.107)

(0.0887)

–

–

−0.113

−0.314∗

–

–

(0.183)

(0.130)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Table 6: High School Games Hurdle Binomial Models: (i) Top 5 rounds (ii) Top 10
rounds (iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds with lastDraft. Standard
Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

5.804∗

5.233 ∗ ∗

5.858∗

5.395 ∗ ∗

(2.388)

(1.858)

(2.392)

(1.864)

−0.00117∗

−0.000918∗

−0.00117∗

−0.000877∗

(0.000545)

(0.000441)

(0.000546)

(0.000442)

−0.367 ∗ ∗

−0.361 ∗ ∗∗

−0.364 ∗ ∗

−0.355 ∗ ∗∗

(0.130)

(0.101)

(0.130)

(0.101)

5.917 ∗ ∗∗

8.773 ∗ ∗∗

6.005 ∗ ∗∗

9.084 ∗ ∗∗

(0.843)

(0.795)

(0.859)

(0.811)

0.278∗

0.368 ∗ ∗∗

0.276∗

0.368 ∗ ∗∗

(0.110)

(0.0915)

(0.110)

(0.0917)

–

–

−0.137

−0.361 ∗ ∗

–

–

(0.187)

(0.134)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Table 7: High School Games Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Probability Models: (i)
Top 5 rounds (ii) Top 10 rounds (iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds
with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.

50

8 FIGURES AND TABLES

Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

6.418 ∗ ∗∗

6.226 ∗ ∗∗

6.558 ∗ ∗∗

6.368 ∗ ∗∗

(1.173)

(1.191)

(1.212)

(1.247)

−0.00040549

−0.000307

−0.000370

−0.000236

(0.000275)

(0.000278)

(0.000285)

(0.000292)

−0.455 ∗ ∗∗

−0.425 ∗ ∗∗

−0.471 ∗ ∗∗

−0.445 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0643)

(0.0653)

(0.0664)

(0.0684)

12.222 ∗ ∗∗

14.212 ∗ ∗∗

15.66 ∗ ∗∗

20.01 ∗ ∗∗

(0.529)

(0.581)

(0.796)

(0.945)

0.380 ∗ ∗∗

0.351 ∗ ∗∗

0.453 ∗ ∗∗

0.444 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0585)

(0.0590)

(0.0610)

(0.0625)

–

−0.783 ∗ ∗∗

–

−0.947 ∗ ∗∗

–

(0.0633)

–

(0.0686)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Table 8: High School Top 50 Round Games Probability Models: (i) Hurdle Model
(ii) Hurdle Model with lastDraft (iii) Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model (iv)
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in
parentheses.
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(0.000261)
−0.0666
(0.0596)

(0.000308)
−0.113
(0.0771)

52
–
−0.288 ∗ ∗∗
(0.0247)

–
−0.270 ∗ ∗∗
(0.0283)

(0.0541)

(0.0631)
–

−0.0889

−0.0737

–

(0.197)

(0.217)

(0.0178)

−0.384 ∗ ∗∗

–

–

(0.0349)

−0.0839∗

(0.153)

1.548 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0388)

−0.0429

(0.000166)

−0.00024

(0.0283)

−0.270 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0247)

−0.288 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0801)

0.0286

−0.0482
(0.111)

(0.0541)

−0.0894

(0.200)

1.606 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0597)

−0.0672

(0.000261)

−0.00053∗

(1.092)

2.796∗

(v)

(0.0631)

−0.0729

(0.219)

1.736 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0771)

−0.113

(0.000308)

−0.000497

(1.422)

3.625∗

2.540 ∗ ∗∗
(0.709)

(iv)

(iii)

(0.0178)

−0.385 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0383)

−0.0399

(0.0349)

−0.0833∗

(0.164)

1.610 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0389)

−0.0402

(0.000166)

−0.000234

(0.709)

2.506 ∗ ∗∗

(vi)

10 Rounds (vi) Top 50 Rounds. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.

Table 9: High School WAR Regressions: (i) Top 5 Rounds (ii) Top 10 Rounds (iii) Top 50 Rounds (iv) Top 5 Rounds (v) Top

Log(scale)

lastDraft

Pitcher

√1
pick

Age (in Years)

1.618 ∗ ∗∗

−0.000526∗

−0.000498

1.723 ∗ ∗∗

(1.092)

(1.419)

Relative Age

2.806∗

3.583∗

Intercept

(ii)

(i)

Variable
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–
–

–

(0.0171)

(0.0185)
–

0.112 ∗ ∗∗

0.122 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0103)

(0.0115)

–

–

(0.0138)

0.131 ∗ ∗∗

(0.00725)

−0.000747

(0.0128)

−0.0307∗

−0.0545 ∗ ∗∗
(0.0159)

(0.0173)

0.119 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0103)

−0.00874

(0.0000387)

(0.0184)

0.130 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0113)

−0.00749

−0.00907

−0.00841

(0.132)

0.746 ∗ ∗∗

(vi)

(0.00698)

−0.00343

(0.0149)

0.134 ∗ ∗∗

(0.00726)

−0.000567

(0.0000293)

−0.0000545 −0.0000344

(0.186)

0.930 ∗ ∗∗

(v)

in parentheses.

Top 5 Rounds with lastDraft (v) Top 10 Rounds with lastDraft (vi) Top 50 Rounds with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported

Table 10: High School OPS Regressions Weighted by At-Bats: (i) Top 5 Rounds (ii) Top 10 Rounds (iii) Top 50 Rounds (iv)

lastDraft

√1
pick

Age (in Years)

(0.0000430)

(0.0000293)

(0.0000389)

(0.207)

(0.0000435)

(0.132)

0.927 ∗ ∗∗

(iv)

−0.0000189

(0.187)

(0.210)

0.748 ∗ ∗∗

(iii)

−0.00000381 −0.0000539 −0.0000345

0.910 ∗ ∗∗

0.890 ∗ ∗∗

Intercept

Relative Age

(ii)

(i)

Variable
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

6.392 ∗ ∗∗

8.081 ∗ ∗∗

6.485 ∗ ∗∗

8.053 ∗ ∗∗

(1.680)

(1.303)

(1.691)

(1.304)

0.0000174

0.000165

0.0000189

0.000165

(0.000371)

(0.000321)

(0.000371)

(0.000321)

−0.00520

−0.0936

−0.00454

−0.0951

(0.0789)

(0.0608)

(0.0790)

(0.0609)

1.286 ∗ ∗∗

1.654 ∗ ∗∗

1.287 ∗ ∗∗

1.650 ∗ ∗∗

(0.290)

(0.290)

(0.290)

(0.290)

−1.111 ∗ ∗∗

−1.082 ∗ ∗∗

−1.114 ∗ ∗∗

−1.080 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0804)

(0.0691)

(0.0806)

(0.0694)

–

–

−0.109

0.0642

–

–

(0.222)

(0.162)

−0.348 ∗ ∗∗

−0.465 ∗ ∗∗

−0.347 ∗ ∗∗

−0.465 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0487)

(0.04232)

(0.0487)

(0.0423)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Log(theta)

Table 11: College Games Hurdle Count Models: (i) Top 5 rounds (ii) Top 10 rounds
(iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds with lastDraft. Standard Errors
reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

6.377 ∗ ∗∗

8.089 ∗ ∗∗

6.469 ∗ ∗∗

8.059 ∗ ∗∗

(1.693)

(1.330)

(1.704)

(1.333)

0.0000153

0.000168

0.0000166

0.000168

(0.000373)

(0.000327)

(0.000373)

(0.000327)

−0.00376

−0.0929

−0.00314

−0.0943

(0.0795)

(0.0621)

(0.0796)

(0.0622)

1.201 ∗ ∗∗

1.487 ∗ ∗∗

1.202 ∗ ∗∗

1.482 ∗ ∗∗

(0.289)

(0.286)

(0.289)

(0.286)

−1.116 ∗ ∗∗

−1.092 ∗ ∗∗

−1.119 ∗ ∗∗

−1.090 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0810)

(0.0705)

(0.0813)

(0.0708)

–

–

−0.107

0.0630

–

–

(0.224)

(0.166)

−0.363 ∗ ∗∗

−0.511 ∗ ∗∗

−0.363 ∗ ∗∗

−0.512 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0499)

(0.0446)

(0.0499)

(0.0447)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Log(theta)

Table 12: College Games Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Count Models: (i) Top 5
rounds (ii) Top 10 rounds (iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds with
lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

8.163 ∗ ∗∗

8.186 ∗ ∗∗

8.023 ∗ ∗∗

8.026 ∗ ∗∗

(0.956)

(0.958)

(1.011)

(1.016)

0.0000683

0.0000678

0.0000634

0.0000615

(0.000261)

(0.000261)

(0.000274)

(0.000275)

−0.101∗

−0.104∗

−0.0937∗

−0.0957∗

(0.0442)

(0.0447)

(0.0468)

(0.0474)

2.038 ∗ ∗∗

2.019 ∗ ∗∗

1.738 ∗ ∗∗

1.712 ∗ ∗∗

(0.282)

(0.285)

(0.280)

(0.283)

−1.118 ∗ ∗∗

−1.116 ∗ ∗∗

−1.142 ∗ ∗∗

−1.141 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0579)

(0.0581)

(0.0609)

(0.0614)

–

0.0409

–

0.0445

–

(0.0972)

–

(0.103)

−0.580 ∗ ∗∗

−0.580 ∗ ∗∗

−0.706 ∗ ∗∗

−0.715 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0354)

(0.0354)

(0.0400)

(0.0405)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Log(theta)

Table 13: College Top 50 Round Games Count Models: (i) Hurdle Model (ii) Hurdle
Model with lastDraft (iii) Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model (iv) Zero Inflated
Negative Binomial Model with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

2.966

2.231

2.975

2.232

(2.084)

(1.403)

(2.091)

(1.404)

−0.000838

−0.000461

−0.000838

−0.000470

(0.000497)

(0.000365)

(0.000497)

(0.000365)

−0.156

−0.171 ∗ ∗

−0.156

−0.164∗

(0.0966)

(0.0642)

(0.0967)

(0.0647)

9.990 ∗ ∗∗

14.95 ∗ ∗∗

9.990 ∗ ∗∗

15.06 ∗ ∗∗

(1.069)

(1.093)

(1.070)

(1.104)

−0.293 ∗ ∗

−0.0868

−0.293 ∗ ∗

−0.0897

(0.104)

(0.0767)

(0.104)

(0.0768)

–

–

−0.0190

−0.170

–

–

(0.297)

(0.179)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Table 14: College Games Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Probability Models: (i)
Top 5 rounds (ii) Top 10 rounds (iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds
with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

3.237

3.057∗

3.238

3.062∗

(2.016)

(1.341)

(2.023)

(1.342)

−0.000840

−0.000420

−0.000840

−0.000425

(0.000481)

(0.000349)

(0.000481)

(0.000349)

−0.161

−0.196 ∗ ∗

−0.161

−0.192 ∗ ∗

(0.0937)

(0.0617)

(0.0938)

(0.0621)

8.454 ∗ ∗∗

11.593 ∗ ∗∗

8.454 ∗ ∗∗

11.629 ∗ ∗∗

(0.782)

(0.727)

(0.782)

(0.730)

−0.328 ∗ ∗

−0.131

−0.328 ∗ ∗

−0.133

(0.101)

(0.0735)

(0.101)

(0.0736)

–

–

−0.00118

−0.107

–

–

(0.287)

(0.172)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Table 15: College Games Hurdle Probability Models: (i) Top 5 rounds (ii) Top 10
rounds (iii) Top 5 rounds with lastDraft (iv) Top 10 rounds with lastDraft. Standard
Errors reported in parentheses.
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Variable

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Intercept

4.931 ∗ ∗∗

4.434 ∗ ∗∗

3.806 ∗ ∗∗

3.064 ∗ ∗∗

(0.747)

(0.758)

(0.797)

(0.814)

−0.0000955

−0.0000875

−0.000116

−0.000107

(0.000242)

(0.000243)

(0.000256)

(0.000257)

−0.344 ∗ ∗∗

−0.307 ∗ ∗∗

−0.311 ∗ ∗∗

−0.258 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0339)

(0.0351)

(0.0360)

(0.0374)

20.056 ∗ ∗∗

20.59 ∗ ∗∗

27.34 ∗ ∗∗

28.55 ∗ ∗∗

(0.662)

(0.679)

(1.043)

(1.097)

0.127∗

0.119∗

0.205 ∗ ∗∗

0.195 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0517)

(0.0518)

(0.0547)

(0.0550)

–

−0.404 ∗ ∗∗

–

−0.549 ∗ ∗∗

–

(0.0871)

–

(0.0913)

Relative Age

Age (in Years)

√1
pick

Pitcher

lastDraft

Table 16: College Top 50 Round Games Probability Models: (i) Hurdle Model (ii)
Hurdle Model with lastDraft (iii) Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model (iv) Zero
Inflated Negative Binomial Model with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
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60

(0.0312)

(0.0446)

–
−0.458 ∗ ∗∗
(0.0191)

–
−0.393 ∗ ∗∗
(0.0231)

(0.0344)

(0.0447)
–

−0.0841∗

−0.104∗

–

(0.128)

(0.149)

1.27 ∗ ∗∗

−0.0388

−0.0308

1.22 ∗ ∗∗

(0.000162)

(0.000208)

(0.0150)

−0.548 ∗ ∗∗

–

–

(0.0248)

−0.102 ∗ ∗∗

(0.105)

1.29 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0192)

−0.0292

(0.000116)

0.0000385

(0.415)

2.35 ∗ ∗∗

(iii)

(0.0231)

−0.395 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0191)

−0.458 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0812)

−0.0276

−0.201
(0.125)

(0.03458)

−0.08518∗

(0.128)

1.271 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0313)

−0.03806

(0.000162)

0.000097

(0.670)

2.580 ∗ ∗∗

(v)

(0.0448)

−0.109∗

(0.148)

1.22 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0446)

−0.0275

(0.000208)

0.0000837

(0.952)

2.57 ∗ ∗

(iv)

(0.0150)

−0.548 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0422)

−0.00628

(0.0249)

−0.102 ∗ ∗∗

(0.107)

1.29 ∗ ∗∗

(0.0194)

−0.0287

(0.000116)

0.0000383

(0.416)

2.35 ∗ ∗∗

(vi)

(v) Top 10 Rounds with lastDraft (vi) Top 50 Rounds with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in parentheses.

Table 17: College WAR Regressions: (i) Top 5 Rounds (ii) Top 10 Rounds (iii) Top 50 Rounds (iv) Top 5 Rounds with lastDraft

Log(scale)

lastDraft

Pitcher

√1
pick

Age (in Years)

0.0000967

(0.669)

(0.951)
0.0000836

2.57 ∗ ∗∗

2.45 ∗ ∗

Intercept

Relative Age

(ii)

(i)

Variable

8 FIGURES AND TABLES

0.00538
(0.00626)

−0.00458
(0.00895)

61

–
–

–
–

–

–

(0.0154)

0.128 ∗ ∗∗

(0.00435)

−0.000464

(0.0000231)

0.0000521∗

(0.0928)

0.734 ∗ ∗∗

(iii)

(0.0263)

0.00358

(0.0219)

0.106 ∗ ∗∗

(0.00896)

−0.00453

(0.0000389)

0.000112 ∗ ∗

(0.193)

0.814 ∗ ∗∗

(iv)

(0.0191)

0.0211

(0.0186)

0.124 ∗ ∗∗

(0.00625)

0.00548

(0.0000310)

0.0000920 ∗ ∗

(0.134)

0.580 ∗ ∗∗

(v)

(0.0101)

0.00475

(0.0154)

0.127 ∗ ∗∗

(0.00437)

−0.000620

(0.0000231)

0.0000523∗

(0.0929)

0.733 ∗ ∗∗

(vi)

parentheses.

5 Rounds with lastDraft (v) Top 10 Rounds with lastDraft (vi) Top 50 Rounds with lastDraft. Standard Errors reported in

Table 18: College OPS Regressions Weighted by At-Bats: (i) Top 5 Rounds (ii) Top 10 Rounds (iii) Top 50 Rounds (iv) Top

lastDraft

√1
pick

Age (in Years)

(0.0186)

(0.0000308)

(0.0000386)

(0.0218)

0.0000958 ∗ ∗

0.000113 ∗ ∗

0.123 ∗ ∗∗

(0.133)

(0.190)

0.105 ∗ ∗∗

0.600 ∗ ∗∗

0.818 ∗ ∗∗

Intercept

Relative Age

(ii)

(i)

Variable
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